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Professional Responsibility. In re Scott, 694 A.2d 732 (R.I.
1997). An attorney who receives a loan from a client, provides dual
representation in additional loan transactions without disclosing
potential conflicts to the clients and receives a security interest ad-
verse to a client's interest is subject to discipline in the form of a
public censure.
In In re Scott,' the Rhode Island Supreme Court Disciplinary
Board asked the supreme court to determine an appropriate sanc-
tion, if any, for an attorney who had violated the rules of profes-
sional conduct in connection with a number of failed financial
transactions for his clients. 2 The court concluded that any sanc-
tion would protect the public and maintain the integrity of the pro-
fession, rather than punish the attorney. In this case, the court
held that those purposes were best served by a public censure,
rather than suspension. 3
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In 1988, Attorney Joseph Scott (Scott) represented Edgar and
Roberta Clark (Clarks) in the sale of some commercial real-estate.4
The Clarks received a substantial sum of money for this sale and
requested Scott's assistance concerning investment advice and op-
portunities. 5 This request began a series of three transactions, all
taking place in January of 1988, that ultimately led to the discipli-
nary action taken in this case.6
The first transaction involved a loan in the amount of $25,000
to Scott from the Clarks, which came out of the proceeds of the
Clarks' real-estate sale.7 This loan was secured by a mortgage on
Scott's real-estate and was payable within one year at twelve per-
cent interest per annum.8 Scott prepared the documentation relat-
ing to this loan. 9 He did not disclose to the Clarks the inherent
conflicts of interest associated with this transaction. Additionally,
1. 694 A.2d 732 (R.L 1997).
2. See id.
3. See id. at 736.
4. See id. at 732.
5. See id.
6. See id. at 732-33.
7. See id. at 732.
8. See id. at 732-33.
9. See id. at 733.
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Scott did not advise the Clarks to obtain independent legal advice
before entering into the loan transaction. The loan was repaid by
Scott within the period specified.10
The second transaction involved a loan from the Clarks to two
of Scott's other clients, Howard Hayes (Hayes) and Joanne Des-
saules (Dessaules)." Scott had represented Hayes and Dessaules
in a separate real-estate purchase and had obtained title insurance
for them relative to that transaction. The loan in the amount of
$60,000, arranged by Scott between the parties, supplied addi-
tional financing for Hayes's and Dessaules's real-estate purchase.
The loan was secured by a second mortgage taken on real estate
owned by Dessaules and required interest payments of twelve per-
cent per annum. Scott represented all parties at the closing and
again failed to advise any of the clients of the potential conflicts of
interests involved.' 2 Additionally, Scott did not obtain title insur-
ance for this transaction. 13
The third transaction involved a loan in the amount of $30,000
from the Clarks to Jo Ann Pelchat (Pelchat), also a client of Scott,
for the purpose of providing Pelchat with financing for a residen-
tial-property purchase. 14 The loan terms required principal and
interest payments over five years at twelve percent per annum.
Again, Scott represented all the parties and did not disclose the
conflict-of-interest problem. 15
After these transactions were completed, problems began to
occur in regard to repayment of each of the loans. 16 The first prob-
lem involved the loan to Hayes and Dessaules, whose payments to
the Clarks were timely throughout 1988.17 In fact, in October of
1988, Hayes and Dessaules paid $30,000 to the Clarks in order to
reduce the principal on the loan. However, in December of 1988,
when Hayes and Dessaules decided to sell their property, a title
search revealed that there was a pre-existing right of first refusal
in a prior owner that may still be valid. Scott had failed to discover
this right when he performed the original title search for Hayes
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
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and Dessaules.' 8 The potential buyer refused to close the sale. 19
Thereafter, Hayes and Dessaules stopped making payments to the
Clarks as well as to the holder of the first mortgage. 20
In an attempt to protect the interests of all the parties in-
volved, Scott began to make payments to the holder of the first
mortgage on the property and to the Clarks, even though he had no
legal obligation to do so. 21 Scott apparently felt that the failed sale
was a result of his negligence. Ultimately, Scott could not continue
to make these payments, and the holder of the first mortgage fore-
closed upon the property. 22
The next problem involved Pelchat, who had fallen behind in
her payments. Although he was under no obligation to do so, Scott
once again made payments to the Clarks on Pelchat's behalf.23 In
September of 1990, Scott commenced foreclosure proceedings
against Pelchat with the Clarks's authorization, and a foreclosure
sale was scheduled for March 1, 1991. However, Pelchat filed for
chapter 13 bankruptcy on February 28, 1991, which automatically
stayed the foreclosure. 24
After he received notice of the stay, Scott "voluntarily signed
an unsecured promissory note obligating himself to make pay-
ments to the Clarks in the amount of $60,000 plus annual interest
... of 8 percent in sixty equal monthly installments."25 Scott had
determined that the Clarks had lost this amount as a result of his
advice. 26 Scott made payments against the note until 1994, when
he could no longer make timely payments due to financial
difficulties.27
After Scott signed the promissory note, he tried unsuccessfully
to get relief for the Clarks in bankruptcy court from the stay of
foreclosure on the Pelchat property. 28 In November of 1991, Scott
informed the trustee in bankruptcy that a potential buyer for the
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. Id. at 733-34.
26. See id. at 734.
27. See id.
28. See id
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Pelchat property had been found.29 The terms of the purchase-
and-sale agreement provided that Scott would hold a first mort-
gage of $30,000, with purchase price of $45,000. The Clarks de-
clined an opportunity to hold a mortgage on the property. On
March 23, 1992, they discharged their mortgage on the property by
signing a document indicating that they had received full payment
for the Pelchat mortgage, which was not true.30 The Clarks re-
ceived nothing from the sale. A $32,000 mortgage was recorded on
the property in Scott's wife's name, which was paid in full when
the property was subsequently sold in 1993. 31 Scott did not tell the
Clarks of the inherent conflict of interest involved in this
transaction. 32
After this sale, Pelchat's bankruptcy proceeding concluded.33
Scott received a payment of $7,420.93 from the trustee as the
Clark's attorney.3 4 Scott used some of this money to make pay-
ments on his promissory note to the Clarks and applied the rest
toward his own attorney's fees. In 1994, Scott fell behind in his
note payments to the Clarks, and they hired a new attorney to pur-
sue a civil action against him.35 A disciplinary complaint was also
filed against Scott.36
Based on the foregoing, the disciplinary board determined that
Scott "had violated Disciplinary Rules 5-101(A), 5-104(A), 5-105(B)
and 5-105(C) of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rules
1.7(b) and 1.8(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct."37
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
With respect to Scott's loan from the Clarks, the supreme
court held that the board had correctly concluded that Scott had
violated Rules 5-101(A) and 5-104(a) when he borrowed money
from the Clarks.38
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. Id. For a discussion of the relevant portions of these rules, see infra notes
38, 44 and accompanying text.
38. See id. Rule 5-101(A) provides that:
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The court noted that Scott had represented the Clarks in real-
estate transactions where sizable profits were realized,39 and these
clients had "turned to him as their legal advisor for advice on how
to invest those funds."40 The court described the obligation arising
in that circumstance by stating that when a lawyer receives a loan
from a client, the loan "creates an inherent conflict that ... will
impede the attorney's obligation to render independent profes-
sional advice to the client."41 The court acknowledged that the
terms of the loan appeared reasonable and that Scott had fully sat-
isfied the loan.42 However, Scott's failure to notify the Clarks of
the potential conflicts was "dispositive under [the] rules."4 3
Next, with regard to the loans from the Clarks to Hayes and
Dessaules and to Pelchat, the court found that Scott's lack of full
disclosure violated Disciplinary Rules 5-105(B) and 5-105(C).4 4
The court pointed out that Scott represented the borrower and
lender in the loan transactions between the parties. 45 Regardless
of how agreeable the terms of the loans may have been, Scott still
Rule 5-101(A). "Except with the consent of his client after full disclo-
sure a lawyer shall not accept employment if the exercise of his profes-
sional judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be
affected by his own financial, business, property, or personal interests."
Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-101(A) (1996-97).
Rule 5-104(A). "A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction
with a client if they have differing interests therein and if the client ex-
pects the lawyer to exercise his professional judgment therein for the pro-
tection of the client, unless the client has consented after full disclosure."
Id. at DR 5-104(A) (emphasis added).
39. See Scott, 694 A.2d at 734.
40. Id. at 734-35.
41. Id. at 735.
42. See id.
43. Id.
44. See id. Rule 5-105(B) provides:
(B) "A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of his
independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely
to be adversely affected by his representation of another client, except to
the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C)." Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility DR 5-105(B).
Rule 5-105(C) provides:
(C) "In the situations covered by DR 5-105(A) and (B), a lawyer may repre-
sent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the
interest of each and if each consents to the representation after full disclo-
sure of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of his
independent professional judgment on behalf of each." Id. at DR 5-105(C)
(emphasis added.).
45. See Scott, 694 A.2d at 735.
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had an obligation to inform the parties of the potential conflicts
and receive their consent to the representation, which he did not
do.46
Furthermore, in an attempt to keep the loans current by per-
sonally assuming responsibility for payment, Scott violated Rule
1.7(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.47 Scott did not tell any
of his clients that they had the right to obtain independent counsel,
nor did he investigate whether another client's interest, or even his
own interest, may have been adversely affected by his dual
representation.48
Finally, the board found that Scott had violated Rule 1.8(a) of
the Rules of Professional Conduct for receiving a mortgage in his
wife's name on the Pelchat property incidental to the sale.49 The
relevant portion of Rule 1.8(a) provides:
A lawyer shall not... knowingly acquire an ownership, pos-
sessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a cli-
ent unless:
(1) the transaction and terms in which the lawyer acquires
the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are
fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in
a manner which can be reasonably understood by the
client;
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the
advice of independent counsel in the transaction; and
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.50
The court concluded that Scott had not complied with the require-
ments of Rule 1.8(a) with respect to the Pelchat property.51
46. See id.
47. See id. The relevant portion of that rule provides:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another cli-
ent or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be ad-
versely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7(b)(1), (2) (1996-97) (emphasis
added).
48. See Scott, 694 A.2d at 735.
49. See id.
50. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.8(a).
51. See Scott, 694 A.2d at 736.
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The board's recommendation concerning these violations was
that Scott be publicly censured. 52 Although not bound by this rec-
ommendation, the supreme court supported the board's position.
The court, in closing, declared that Scott had not intended to harm
his clients, and commended him for his extraordinary efforts to rec-
tify the mistakes he made by voluntarily paying more than
$120,000 of his own money. Nonetheless, the court decided Scott
should be publicly censured.53
CONCLUSION
In this case, a lawyer was in a position to benefit from relation-
ships with his clients. In the first instance, he received a seem-
ingly harmless loan from one of his clients and promptly paid it
back.54 Although there may have been no harm done to anyone as
a result of this transaction, the supreme court declared that the
attorney needed to obtain informed consent from the client before
such a transaction could transpire. Absent that consent, a viola-
tion arises. 55 Moreover, in a situation involving loans similar to
those made to Hayes and Dessaules and to Pelchat, if the attorney
fails to fully inform his clients of the potential conflicts of dual rep-
resentation, then he or she is subject to disciplinary proceedings.
Michael F. Drywa, Jr.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 732-33.
55. See id. at 735.
